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1971]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

CPLR 308(1): Service on attorney in defendant'spresence deemed valid.
Under CPLR 808(1), in order to be effective a summons must be
delivered within the state to the party to be served. Lack of personal
delivery is excusable where the defendant's conduct makes such service
difficult or impossible.4 Beyond this exception, however, the courts
have often enforced CPLR 308(1) strictly. 49 For example, in Foster v.
McMorran,50 where X was wrongfully served but he redelivered the
summons to Y (the true defendant) service was held invalid. Nonetheless, a more liberal stance was taken in the recent case of Davidman v.
Ortiz.1
In Davidman defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the
court lacked jurisdiction over him. The defendant averred that service
of the summons was made upon his attorney and not upon him personally, although defendant admitted that the attorney was served in his
presence. The Supreme Court, Queens County, stressed that the pur2
pose of service is reasonable notice that an action is being brought
and, noting that defendant was fully informed of the nature of the papers served upon his attorney, refused to vacate service.
Of course, the mode of service employed in Davidman was not
technically in compliance with CPLR 308(1). And, it can be speculated
that a different result would have issued if the attorney was not served
in the defendant's presence.53 Nevertheless, it is difficult to discredit the
court's holding inasmuch as the service not only fully apprised defendant of the pending action, but was more practical and logical in the
circumstances than service upon the defendant personally. Certainly,
courts should be wary of sustaining improper service which would promote carelessness and increase the possibility of default. 4 But in situations such as Davidman where the spirit of the law has been met, literal
48 See, e.g., Buscher v. Ehrich, 12 App. Div. 2d 887, 209 N.Y.S.2d 941 (4th Dep't 1961)
(summons left with defendant's husband at her residence after she refused to come to the
door); Chernick v. Rodriguez, 2 Misc. 2d 891, 150 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1956) (summons left at door after defendant refused to open it); Levine v. National
Transp. Co., 204 Misc. 202, 125 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1953) (summons
left in the frame of the door of the car in which defendant had locked himself).
49 Cf. McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y2d 111, 238 NX.2d 726, 291 N.Y.S.2d 328
(1968). The tenor of McDonald, i.e., strict compliance with the service provisions of the
CPLR, makes it difficult to reconcile exceptions to the rule. See 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 808,
supp. commentary at 196 (1970).
80 33 App. Div. 2d 978, 307 N.Y.S.2d 291 (4th Dep't 1970).
5163 Misc. 2d 984, 314 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1970).
82 See Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Borden Co., 268 F. Supp. 303, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
83 Cf. State-Wide Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 30 App. Div. 2d 694, 291 N.Y.S.2d 928 (2d Dep't
1968) (service of notice of petition to stay arbitration on attorney deemed invalid).
54 See McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 116, 238 NXE2d 726, 728, 291
N.Y.S.2d 328, 332 (1968).
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compliance with the CPLR should yield to the court's fundamental
sense of fairness. 55
CPLR 320: The appearingnonresident- Everitt revisited.
In Everitt v. Everitt5" an action was commenced against a nondomiciliary by serving her while she was temporarily within the state. The
summons was accompanied by a notice stating that the action was being
brought for breach of contract and that judgment would be taken in
the amount of $46,900 in the event of default. 57 After defendant had
entered an appearance in the action, she was served with a complaint
containing an additional cause of action for libel demanding damages
of $350,000. Reasoning that the default notice was rendered ineffective
by the defendant's appearance, a majority of the Court of Appeals permitted the libel cause of action to stand despite defendant's assertion
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim.
An appearance without timely objection to jurisdiction confers
full in personam jurisdiction over the defendant 58 in most instances. 59
Nonetheless, it has been maintained that fundamental due process
objections are raised by Everitt inasmuch as the defendant had not appeared in the action to defend a $350,000 claim for libel and, conceivably, she would have elected to default had she been aware of the enormity of the plaintiff's additional claim. 60 Accordingly, it has been
concluded that when a defendant does enter an appearance, it should
not be viewed as a "submission to a free-wheeling form of in personam
jurisdiction on any and all causes of action by any and all parties to the
action."" 1 Moreover, it could be posited that the plaintiff in Everitt employed the $46,000 contract action with the attendant risk to defendant
of absolute liability via default as a lever for securing jurisdiction in the
much larger libel action. Similar considerations were deemed to outweigh the interests of the plaintiff and the court in resolving all issues
in one action where the plaintiff has secured jurisdiction by attaching
property owned by a nonresident. 62 Possibly, an expansive reading of
55 See Belofatto v. Marsen Realty Corp., 62 Misc. 2d 922, 310 N.Y.S.2d 191 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 342, 350
(1970).
56 4 N.Y.2d 13, 148 N.E.2d 891, 171 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1958).
57 See CPLR §§ 305 & 3215(e).

58 CPLR 320(b).

59 Two exceptions are the limited appearance under CPLR 320(c) and the restricted
appearance under CPLR 320(b).
6o Everitt v. Everitt, 4 N.Y.2d 13, 18, 148 N.E.2d 891, 894, 171 N.Y.S.2d 836, 840 (1958)
(dissenting opinion). But see 3 WK&M 3025.10.
61 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 320, supp. commentary at 244 (1970).
62 See FIFTEENTH ANNUAL

YoRK A109-113 (1970).
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